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Abstract
Prior studies have identi"ed systematic and time persistent di!erences in analysts'
earnings forecast accuracy, but have not explained why the di!erences exist. Using
the I/B/E/S Detail History database, this study "nds that forecast accuracy is posi-
tively associated with analysts' experience (a surrogate for analyst ability and skill)
and employer size (a surrogate for resources available), and negatively associated
with the number of "rms and industries followed by the analyst (measures of task
complexity). The results suggest that analysts' characteristics may be useful in predicting
di!erences in forecasting performance, and that market expectations studies may be
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improved by modeling these characteristics. ( 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
Prior research provides mixed results about whether systematic di!erences in
"nancial analysts' forecast accuracy exist. While a number of early studies do
not identify signi"cant di!erences in forecast accuracy, more recent studies
document systematic di!erences. In particular, early studies by Richards (1976),
Brown and Roze! (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien
(1990) and Butler and Lang (1991) do not "nd systematic di!erences in forecast
accuracy. More recent studies including Stickel (1992) and Sinha, Brown and
Das (1997), however, document systematic di!erences in analysts' forecast
accuracy. This paper builds on the more recent studies by investigating analysts'
characteristics that are potentially associated with forecast accuracy.
Research that examines the determinants of forecast accuracy is important for
at least two reasons. First, given analysts' role as expert "nancial intermediaries
(that is, experts in using and interpreting "nancial information), accounting
researchers are interested in knowing whether di!erences in forecast accuracy
exist and the factors that contribute to the di!erences. Prior studies may not
have identi"ed di!erences in forecast accuracy because they did not control for
factors that contribute to the di!erences. Second, an understanding of the
determinants of forecast accuracy is important to accounting researchers who
use analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy for the capital markets' expectation of
earnings. If analysts' forecast accuracy di!ers predictably, and if the capital
markets recognize these di!erences, then more accurate proxies for earnings
expectations can be created by applying larger weights to the forecasts of more
accurate analysts.
Stickel (1992) "nds that Institutional Investor All-American analysts' fore-
casts are more accurate than NonAll-Americans' forecasts. He "nds that All-
Americans are more accurate forecasters, forecast more frequently, and their
upward forecast revisions have a greater impact on stock prices than do the
upward revisions of NonAll-Americans. The capital market response to upward
revisions documented by Stickel suggests that capital market participants be-
lieve di!erences exist in forecast accuracy.
Sinha, Brown and Das (1997) (hereafter SBD) identify systematic di!erences
in forecast accuracy among a larger body of analysts. Using I/B/E/S data from
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1984}1990, they extend O'Brien's work. Noting that forecast errors tend to be
serially correlated, they include controls in their model for forecast recency.
Their results suggest that systematic ex-post di!erences exist in analysts forecast
accuracy. SBD also perform ex-ante tests of forecast accuracy. They "nd that
analysts classi"ed as superior in one period continue to be classi"ed as superior
in later periods, but analysts classi"ed as inferior in one period do not continue
to be classi"ed as inferior in later periods.
While Stickel and SBD identify di!erences in forecast accuracy, they do not
explain why the di!erences exist. The objective of these studies is to determine
whether systematic di!erences exist. It is possible that di!erences in ability,
resources and portfolio complexity contribute to di!erences in forecast accu-
racy. The objective of the current study is to identify analysts' characteristics
that are associated with the di!erences.
I use cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate whether analysts'
forecast errors are associated with the combination of their experience, the
number of "rms and industries followed, and employer size. The joint analysis of
the ability, task complexity and resources is important since the three are
potentially correlated. In addition, I also control for "rm-year variation in both
the dependent and independent variables. This is important because the pre-
dictability of a "rm's earnings can vary across time (see Clement, 1998).
I "nd that forecast accuracy is positively associated with general and "rm-
speci"c forecasting experience and employer size, and negatively associated with
the number of "rms and industries followed. Given the magnitudes of the
regression coe$cients and the distributions of the regression variables, my
overall conclusion is that employer size alone, or the other variables taken in
combination, may provide information for capital market participants to pre-
dict economically meaningful di!erences in forecast accuracy. For example,
analysts who work for large employers have average forecast errors that are
7.7% smaller than other analysts.
Concurrent studies by Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1997) (hereafter MWW)
and Jacob, Lys and Neale (1997) (hereafter JLN) also examine factors that may
contribute to analysts' forecast accuracy. MWW use a time series approach
and "nd forecast accuracy and forecasting experience to be related. Like Stickel,
MWW's results may not be generalizable because MWW examine the perfor-
mance of a small group of analysts. In order to estimate time series parameters,
they restrict their sample to analysts who have 32 continuous quarters of
forecasts for a company. This requirement causes 97% of the potential sample to
be excluded. The incremental contributions of my study over MWW are that
I use a larger sample and a broader set of variables (i.e., resources and task
complexity) to investigate di!erences in forecast accuracy.
JLN examine the contributions of experience and brokerage house variables
on analyst forecasting attributes including forecast accuracy, frequency and
horizon. Consistent with my study they "nd employer size is associated with
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1 It is possible that the stronger performers are promoted to other positions (e.g., mutual fund
managers). This argument is inconsistent, however, with reports in the "nancial press. For example,
the June 19, 1997 Wall Street Journal article `Sixteen All-Stars Excel for Fifth Timea, acknowledges
the performance of 16 security analysts who placed on the All-Star team 5 years in a row. The story
notes, `At big "rms, compensation of $300,000 to $600,000 for top analysts is common and $1
million is possible.a Similarly, the June 20, 1996 Wall Street Journal article `A few analysts shine year
after yeara, notes that 80 of 440 All-Stars were on the team 3 of the previous 4 years. The implication
of these stories is that strong performers have an incentive to stay in the profession.
2Forecast accuracy is only one of several criteria used to rank analysts. Other criteria include
stock picking ability, quality of written research reports and client service. The study assumes
analysts' performance is positively correlated along these dimensions. That is, a good forecaster is
likely to be a good stock picker who writes good reports and provides good client service.
forecast accuracy. They also "nd that forecast accuracy is positively associated
with the brokerage house's degree of industry specialization and negatively
associated with brokerage house turnover. Unlike my study and MWW, JLN
do not "nd evidence that forecast accuracy improves with experience. The
contrast in results may be due to di!erences in research design. For example,
I control for "rm-year "xed e!ects while JLN do not. On the other hand, JLN
include variables not included in my study such as forecast frequency.
Section 2 outlines the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the measurement of
variables. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Hypotheses
2.1. Hypotheses for ability
While ability is unobservable, we may observe indicators of ability through
the way the analyst labor market functions. The analyst labor market is
assumed to function as a tournament in which stronger performers continue,
while the weaker performers are forced out of the profession.1 According to
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), the only performance information needed or used
in a tournament is the relative, ordinal information about who did better. This is
consistent with the methods used by brokerage "rms and clients to evaluate
analysts. For example, when money managers are asked to rank analysts for
inclusion on the All-American Team, they are asked to rank analysts against
other analysts in the same industry.2 If these ordinal rankings a!ect analysts'
tenure, then we should expect more experienced analysts to be more accurate. (It
is possible, however, that an analyst may survive long term due to luck rather
than skill.) Another reason that analysts with greater experience may supply
more accurate forecasts is that their general skills and knowledge improve with
time. For example, analysts may become better at analyzing "nancial statements
or recognizing economic trends as they gain experience.
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3Commenting on the role resources play in performance, Andrew Melnick, director of global
equity research at Merrill Lynch said, `Today the senior analyst needs strong associates [assistants],
and part of their job is to make the star look like a star.aMelnick further noted that the growth in
Merrill's research sta! has come not so much from senior analysts as from these associates. `They
are critical to maintaining our research franchise and the franchise of the superstarsa, he added. (See
Institutional Investor Magazine, 1996, p. 52.)
In addition to acquiring general skills, analysts also acquire "rm-speci"c skills
over time (i.e., skills speci"c to the "rms they follow). For example, these skills
might include a better understanding of the idiosyncrasies of a particular "rm's
reporting practices or the analyst might establish better relationships with
insiders and thereby gain better access to managers' private information.
Given these observations, the hypotheses for ability are as follows:
H
1
: Holding resources (employer size) and portfolio complexity (number of




: Holding resources (employer size) and portfolio complexity (number of
"rms and industries followed) constant, forecast accuracy increases with
"rm-speci"c forecasting experience.
2.2. Hypotheses for portfolio complexity
An analyst's portfolio complexity is also likely to be associated with forecast
accuracy. The numbers of "rms and industries followed are used as proxies for
portfolio complexity based on the assumption that it is more di$cult to follow
a larger set of "rms and industries. In other words, larger portfolios allow the
analyst to devote less attention to each individual "rm. Furthermore, Lees
(1981) concludes that there are economies of scale to following "rms in a particu-
lar industry. In a setting where analysts face identical e!ort constraints and
diminishing returns to e!ort, the magnitude of forecast errors will increase as
analysts increase the number of companies and industries followed. These
observations lead to the following hypotheses regarding portfolio complexity:
H
3
: Holding ability and resources constant, forecast accuracy decreases with
the number of "rms followed.
H
4
: Holding ability and resources constant, forecast accuracy decreases with
the number of industries followed.
2.3. Hypotheses for resources
Large brokers may provide superior resources that contribute to the forecast
accuracy of their analysts. For example, analysts employed by large brokerage
"rms may have access to better data sets and administrative support.3 They may
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also have better access to the private information of managers at the "rms they
follow. Stickel (1995) provides evidence that capital market participants respond
more to the buy and sell recommendations of analysts employed by large
brokerage houses relative to other analysts. He attributes this di!erence to the
larger "rms' more advanced distribution networks, which allow large "rms to
better disseminate their analysts' recommendations into the capital markets. If
larger brokerage "rms provide superior resources for distributing buy and sell
recommendations, they may also provide superior resources for analysts in
performing their research. These observations suggest that when ability and
portfolio complexity are held constant, analysts employed by large brokerage




: Holding ability and portfolio complexity constant, analysts who are
employed by large brokers supply more accurate forecasts than other
analysts.
2.4. Correlation of ability, complexity and resources
The joint analysis of ability, complexity and resources is important because
the three factors are likely to be correlated. Omission of the correlated variables
from the analysis would result in biased estimates of the relationship between
performance and the individual variables. The following discussion illustrates
some settings in which the variables would be correlated.
Ability and complexity would be correlated if the most able analysts follow
the most complex portfolios. Ability would be correlated with resources if high
ability analysts work in environments that provide greater resources. Similarly,
the two factors would be correlated if large "rms hire more able analysts.
Finally, complexity would be correlated with resources if analysts who work for
large employers follow a smaller number of "rms and industries than do
analysts who work for other employers.
The preceding discussion suggests that ability, portfolio complexity, and
resources should be jointly analyzed to prevent biased estimates of the relation-
ships between each of the factors and forecast accuracy. These observations also
raise the possibility that the factors a!ecting forecast accuracy may be jointly
determined. For example, the most able analysts may choose, or be assigned, to
follow the most complex portfolios. Or the most able analysts may have the
greatest labor market opportunities and may choose to work for employers who
provide the greatest resources. If the factors that determine forecast accuracy are
jointly determined, then the regression coe$cients estimated in the following
analyses may su!er from simultaneity bias. To address this issue a model of
brokerage "rm resource allocation is required. Development of such a model is
beyond the scope of this study and is a potential area for future research.
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4Analyst i is included in the calculation of AFE
jt
since he too is a!ected by the "rm-year e!ect.
3. Data and sample selection
3.1. Measurement of variables
3.1.1. Dependent variable
I measure performance by comparing the analyst's absolute forecast error to
the average absolute forecast error of other analysts following the same stock
during the same time period. The performance measure used here is the propor-
















is the absolute forecast error for
analyst i's forecast of "rm j for year t, and AFE
jt
is the mean absolute forecast
error for "rm j for year t.
Clement (1998) "nds that controlling for "rm-year e!ects increases the likeli-
hood of identifying systematic di!erences in analysts' forecast accuracy relative
to a model that controls for "rm "xed e!ects and year "xed e!ects. Firm-year
e!ects result from factors that make a "rm's earnings easier or more di$cult to
predict in some years than others. Examples of events that may give rise to
"rm-year e!ects are voluntary management disclosures, mergers and strikes.
PMAFE controls for "rm-year e!ects by subtracting from the absolute forecast
error its related "rm-year mean.4 Clement (1998) also shows that large EPS
"rms have greater variation in their DAFE's than do small EPS "rms, and that
de#ating DAFE by AFE reduces heteroscedasticity. The model in Section 4.2
below was also estimated using DAFE
ijt
as the dependent variable and the
inferences remained unchanged.
PMAFE is calculated using a 30-day minimum forecast horizon and can be
interpreted as analyst i's fractional forecast error relative to the average of the
analysts' absolute forecast errors for "rm j at year t. Negative values of PMAFE
represent better than average performance while positive values of PMAFE
represent worse than average performance.
3.1.2. Proxies for ability
H
1
predicts analysts' forecasts become more accurate with increases in fore-




"number of years for which analyst i supplied at least one fore-
cast during the "rst 11 months of the year through year t.
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5Since the data are left censored, analysts appearing in the 1983 sample are excluded from the
calculation of all variables, including AFE
jt
.
The 11-month requirement is imposed based on the assumption that active
analysts would supply forecasts for the "rms they follow during this period. An
analyst who only releases forecasts more than 12 months prior to period end is not
likely to be following companies very closely. Similarly, an analyst who only releases
forecasts less than 30 days prior to period end is more likely to be mimicking the
forecasts of other analysts rather than following the companies himself. The
11-month requirement is also imposed on the other variables in the model.5
H
2
predicts that forecast accuracy increases with "rm-speci"c experience. The
proxy for the number of years of "rm-speci"c experience is calculated using the
analyst's experience following a particular "rm as follows:
FEXP
ijt
"number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied
at least one forecast during the "rst 11 months of the year
for "rm j.





state that when ability and resources are held constant, forecast
accuracy decreases with the number of companies and industries followed. The
number of "rms followed is determined by counting the number of ticker
symbols for which the analyst made forecasts in a given year as follows:
NCOS
it
"number of "rms for which analyst i supplied at least one fore-
cast during the "rst 11 months of year t.
Two-digit SICs are used as the proxy for industries and the variable used for
the number of industries followed is calculated as:
NSIC2
it
"number of two-digit SICs for which analyst i supplied at
least one forecast during the "rst 11 months of year t.
3.1.4. Proxy for available resources
H
5
predicts that analysts employed by large brokers will supply more accu-
rate forecasts than other analysts will. Like Stickel (1995), I assume there are two
levels of resources provided by employers: one level provided by large employers
and another level provided by all other employers. He uses a dummy variable to
identify analysts employed by large brokers. I use a similar approach and
calculate employer size as:
D¹OP10
it
"a dummy variable set to 1 if analyst i is employed by a "rm
in the top size decile during year t, and set to 0 otherwise.
Size deciles are calculated based on the number of analysts
employed in year t.
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6The approach used here is analogous to estimating a model using "rm-year dummy variables to
control for "rm-year e!ects.
7Teams were removed from the sample by excluding analysts who had a slash (/), an ampersand
(&), the word `anda, or the word `groupa in their names from the sample.
This speci"cation assumes there is an elite set of brokerage "rms that provides
a higher level of resources than other "rms. These elite "rms are generally
referred to as `bulge bracket "rmsa in the investment-banking community.
3.1.5. Control variables
Results from prior research suggest that forecast age, "rm e!ects, and year
e!ects should be controlled for when evaluating di!erences in analysts' forecast-
ing ability. PMAFE controls for "rm and year e!ects by adjusting absolute
forecast errors by their related "rm-year means. The model's independent
variables are also adjusted by their related "rm-year means to properly control









)b. (See Greene (1991) for a more detailed description of using mean
adjusted data to control for "xed e!ects.)
I control for forecast age by including the forecast's age in days as an
independent variable. Forecast age is measured as:
AGE
ijt
"age (in days) of analyst i's forecast for "rm j's earnings at time t.
3.2. Description of the I/B/E/S data set and sample selection method
The data for this study were obtained from the Institutional Broker Estimate
System (I/B/E/S) Detail History tape. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the
I/B/E/S data set. The data set covers the period from 1983 to 1994 and contains
over 1 million forecasts for the annual earnings of more than 9,500 companies
made by over 7,500 analysts. Analyst codes are used to identify analysts on the
academic tape. These codes remain with an analyst as he moves from broker to
broker. Some entries to the data set are forecasts supplied by individual analysts
and others are supplied by teams of analysts. The analyst codes on the usual
academic tapes do not distinguish between individuals and teams, and this
makes it impossible to identify teams of analysts. The I/B/E/S broker translation
"le is used to eliminate teams from the sample.7 Panel A of Table 1 reports
sample statistics after eliminating analyst teams. This sample is referred to as the
initial sample.
The sample is restricted to forecasts supplied during the "rst 11 months of the
"scal year in an attempt to capture the forecasts of active analysts. Once
forecasts from the "rst 11 months are identi"ed, forecasts with a minimum
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forecast horizon of 30 days are selected. Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive
statistics after imposing the 11-month requirement and minimum forecast
horizon. This sample is referred to as the intermediate sample. Relative to the
initial sample, the intermediate sample has 4% (246/6468) fewer analysts and
73% (890,429/1,219,979) fewer forecasts.
Since the I/B/E/S data set is left censored, it is not possible to tell how much
experience analysts have prior to the "rst year of available data. To mitigate this
problem, analysts who appear in the data set in the initial year (1983) are
excluded from the sample. Forecasts from 1984 are also excluded from the
sample since there would be little variation in the experience variables that year
Table 1
I/B/E/S data set summary statistics
Year No. analysts No. forecasts No. brokers No. "rms
Panel A. Initial sample of annual earnings forecasts
1983 1,548 59,147 101 2,939
1984 1,810 78,428 126 3,444
1985 2,023 98,693 141 3,829
1986 2,199 104,035 145 3,861
1987 2,398 114,295 162 4,296
1988 2,405 114,362 185 4,435
1989 2,408 105,662 189 4,238
1990 2,329 108,711 198 4,077
1991 2,191 107,727 190 4,047
1992 2,332 109,871 205 4,294
1993 2,712 113,973 221 4,725
1994 2,824 105,075 233 5,249
Total 6,468 1,219,979 357 9,707
Panel B. Sample after imposing the 11-month and 30-day minimum forecast horizon requirements
1983 1,403 19,344 89 2,306
1984 1,659 21,658 112 2,672
1985 1,913 25,021 136 2,971
1986 2,075 27,885 141 3,239
1987 2,270 30,144 152 3,733
1988 2,263 28,895 171 3,794
1989 2,310 28,872 185 3,669
1990 2,214 28,720 190 3,655
1991 2,109 27,573 188 3,570
1992 2,212 28,724 189 3,797
1993 2,548 31,902 215 4,185
1994 2,584 30,812 223 4,274
Total 6,222 329,550 349 8,324
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8Some companies are followed on a primary EPS basis and others are followed on a fully diluted
EPS basis. I/B/E/S makes any necessary adjustments to forecasts so they are on the same basis that
the "rm is normally followed.
(i.e., the experience variables can take on values of 0 or 1 in 1984). Panel
C reports descriptive statistics after imposing these restrictions. This is the "nal
sample. Relative to the intermediate sample, the "nal sample has 24%
(1,646/6,222) fewer analysts and 42% (139,911/329,550) fewer forecasts. Panels
B and C suggest that most of the reduction takes place during early years of the
sample. For example, relative to the initial sample, the "nal sample has 42%
(59,439/140,817) fewer forecasts in 1985}1989, but only 27% (39,347/147,731)
fewer forecasts for 1990}1994.
The study also uses the I/B/E/S Actuals "le. The Actuals "le contains the
company ticker, a measure indicator, a periodicity indicator, the "scal period
end date, the actual value and the report date. I/B/E/S adjusts the Actuals "le
so that all forecasts and reported earnings are stated on the same basis.8
Most analysts provide forecasts of income from continuing operations and
Table 1. (continued)
Panel C. Final sample after controlling for left censoring
Year No. analysts No. forecasts No. brokers No. "rms
1985 962 10,596 125 2,499
1986 1,255 14,712 135 2,808
1987 1,518 17,846 145 3,307
1988 1,597 18,518 165 3,446
1989 1,695 19,706 182 3,371
1990 1,669 20,176 184 3,434
1991 1,600 19,720 175 3,375
1992 1,740 20,905 180 3,609
1993 2,088 23,931 208 3,960
1994 2,144 23,529 215 4,084
Total 4,758 189,639 324 7,540
Notes: This table reconciles the full I/B/E/S data set to the sample used in the study. Panel A shows
descriptive statistics for annual forecasts in the data set after removing teams. Panel B shows
descriptive statistics for the last forecast for each analyst-"rm pair during the "rst 11 months of the
"scal year (i.e., a minimum forecast horizon of 30 days). Panel C is the "nal sample. It shows
descriptive statistics after removing 1983 analysts and 1984 forecasts to control for left censoring. No.
analysts represents the number of analysts in the sample. Total analysts represents the unique number
of analysts in the sample. No. forecasts represents the number of annual earnings forecasts in the
sample. No. brokers represents the number of brokers (analyst employers) in the sample. Total
brokers represents the unique number of brokers in the sample. No. xrms represents the number of
"rms in the sample. Total xrms represents the unique number of "rms in the sample.
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Table 2
Correlation coe$cients and distributions of regression variables
N"189,639
PMAFE DAGE DGEXP DFEXP DNCOS DNSIC2 DNTOP10
Panel A. Pearson correlation coezcients
PMAFE 1.000
DAGE 0.347 1.000
DGEXP !0.019 0.002 1.000
DFEXP !0.022 0.004 0.633 1.000
DNCOS 0.009 !0.030 0.191 0.114 1.000
DNSIC2 0.031 0.128 0.093 0.034 0.511 1.000
DNTOP1 !0.055 !0.270 0.081 0.057 !0.101 !0.186 1.000
Panel B. Distributions of regression variables
Q1 !0.51 !55.00 !1.04 !0.78 !6.90 !1.50 !0.36
Median !0.08 !12.50 0.00 0.00 !1.25 !0.33 0.00
Q3 0.27 41.06 1.00 0.57 4.47 1.00 0.40
Notes: Panel A shows the Pearson Correlation Coe$cients for the regression variables. All non-zero
correlations in Panel A are statistically signi"cant at the 1% level. Panel B shows the distributions of
the regression variables. Means are not reported in Panel B because by construction the means are
zero. PMAFE"di!erence between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for "rm j at time t and the
mean absolute forecast error for "rm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for "rm
j at time t. DAGE"the age of analyst i's forecast minus the age of the average analyst's forecast
following "rm j at time t, where age is the age of the forecast in days at the minimum forecast horizon
date. DGEXP"the number of years (including time t) that analyst i appeared in the data set minus
the average number of years analysts following "rm j at time t appeared in the data set.
DFEXP"the number of years (including time t) that analyst i supplied a forecast for "rm j minus the
average number of years analysts following "rm j had supplied forecasts. DNCOS"the number of
companies followed by analyst i at time t minus the average number of companies followed by an
analyst following "rm j at time t. DNSIC2"the number of 2 digit SICs followed by analyst i at time
t minus the average number of two-digit SICs followed by an analyst following "rm j at time t.
DNTOP10"dummy variable with value of 1 if analyst works at a top decile size "rm (and
0 otherwise) minus the mean value of dummy variable for analysts following "rm j at time t.
accordingly I/B/E/S backs out non-operating items (e.g., restructuring charges)
when reporting actual earnings.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive univariate statistics
Table 2 shows correlation coe$cients and distributions of the regression
variables. Panel A shows that forecast errors are negatively correlated with
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9The model was checked for serial correlation by regressing residuals on ("rm-year) lagged
residuals. The results suggested serial correlation was present, but the e!ect was small (the serial
correlation coe$cient was less than 0.02). The model was then re-estimated after correcting for serial
correlation and there was no change in conclusions.
general and "rm-speci"c forecasting experience (surrogates for ability), posi-
tively correlated with the number of "rms and industries followed (surrogates
for portfolio complexity), and negatively correlated with employer size (a surro-
gate for resources). Each of these correlations has the predicted sign, but as
previously noted, the joint tests in the following section are more appropriate for
investigating the hypotheses. As suggested in the preceding section, the surro-
gates for ability, portfolio complexity, and resources are correlated. The ability
surrogate is positively correlated with both the portfolio complexity and re-
source surrogates, while the portfolio complexity and resource surrogates are
negatively correlated.
Panel B of Table 2 shows distributions of the regression variables. Means are
not reported because by construction the means are zero. The negative median
values for PMAFE, DAGE, DNCOS, and DNSIC2 indicate that the distribu-
tions for these variables are skewed. The variation reported in the table is
consistent with a setting in which portfolio complexity and resources potentially
a!ect accuracy.
4.2. Results from tests of hypotheses
Recall from Section 3.1.5 that both the dependent and independent variables




































where all variables are "rm-year mean adjusted (the D preceding each variable
stands for di!erenced) and the predicted signs are included below each coe$cient.
Note that the original hypotheses are stated in terms of forecast accuracy, yet
the empirical tests investigate analysts' forecast errors. Small forecast errors
represent a high level of accuracy. Also note that the regression equation does
not require an intercept since means are subtracted from all variables.
Results from the estimation of Eq. (2) are reported in Table 3.9 Panel A shows
the results for the individual annual regressions. As predicted, the coe$cient for
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DN¹OP10 is negative and signi"cant each year. Similarly, the coe$cients for
DFEXP are predominately negative (as predicted), though not always signi"-
cant. The coe$cients for DNCOS and DNSIC2 are predominately positive (as
predicted), though not always signi"cant. The coe$cients for DGEXP are
Table 3





























Panel A. Annual regressions
Year DAGE DGEXP DFEXP DNCOS DNSIC2 DNTOP10 Adj. R2 N
1985 0.36 2.94 0.94 0.13 0.23 !8.04 0.13 10,596
38.80 1.48 0.41 1.97 0.84 4.99
1986 0.20 4.33 !3.08 !0.04 0.00 !8.93 0.04 14,712
23.25 3.27 2.06 0.64 0.00 5.67
1987 0.29 2.82 !1.45 0.06 0.36 !2.74 0.09 17,846
41.58 3.32 1.50 1.17 1.45 1.96
1988 0.27 0.23 !0.14 0.03 0.60 !4.30 0.07 18,518
37.39 0.36 0.19 0.67 2.45 3.06
1989 0.29 !0.09 !1.01 0.09 !0.14 !9.14 0.11 19,706
47.30 0.20 1.76 1.88 0.70 7.29
1990 0.37 !0.06 !1.47 !0.03 0.37 !10.87 0.15 20,176
59.02 0.15 3.10 0.73 1.84 8.54
1991 0.44 !1.58 0.11 0.06 0.41 !9.32 0.18 19,720
63.44 4.38 0.25 1.31 1.94 6.92
1992 0.38 0.36 !1.07 0.08 0.78 !7.51 0.13 20,905
56.14 1.17 2.73 1.71 3.50 5.97
1993 0.42 !0.91 !0.87 0.06 0.65 !7.51 0.18 23,931
71.32 3.54 2.47 1.37 3.08 6.36
1994 0.40 !0.44 !1.07 0.11 0.48 !6.00 0.13 23,529
59.31 1.81 3.26 2.31 2.18 5.01
Pred. sign } } # # !
Panel B. Pooled regression coezcients
Year DAGE DGEXP DFEXP DNCOS DNSIC2 DNTOP10 Adj. R2 N
Pooled10 0.35 !0.40 !0.94 0.07 0.41 !7.72 0.12 189,639
160.66 3.35 6.00 4.50 5.64 18.44
Pooled5 0.40 !0.53 !0.90 0.06 0.55 !8.05 0.16 108,261
138.80 4.06 5.26 2.93 5.72 14.45
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10The model's R2 represents the variation in the dependent variable explained after removing
"rm-year e!ects (all variables in the model are adjusted by subtracting "rm-year means). This is
similar to regressing absolute forecast errors on residuals from a regression of absolute forecast
errors on "rm-year dummies. Since a large source of variation (i.e., "rm-year e!ect) has been
removed from the dependent variable, the R2 is signi"cantly lower than it would be otherwise.
positive and signi"cant (not negative as predicted) in the early years and
negative in the later years. Note that the model appears to "t the data better in
the latter half of the sample than it does in the earlier half of the sample. The
average R2 for the model is 0.09 during 1984}1989 and 0.15 during 1990}1994.10
Note also that the model's coe$cients generally have the predicted signs and are
signi"cant during 1990}1994. The model's weaker performance in 1984}1989
may be the result of the sample size reduction required to control for left
censoring (see Panels B and C in Table 1). In other words, there is likely greater
Table 3 (continued)
Panel C. Time series average regression coezcients
Year DAGE DGEXP DFEXP DNCOS DNSIC2 DNTOP10 n
TS10 0.34 0.76 !0.91 0.06 0.37 !7.44 10
14.21 1.25 2.67 3.18 4.14 9.53
TS5 0.40 !0.53 !0.87 0.06 0.54 !8.24 5
32.56 1.56 3.30 2.36 7.01 9.78
Notes: Coe$cient values are reported as percentages with t-statistics below. PMAFE"di!erence
between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for "rm j at time t and the mean absolute forecast
error for "rm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for "rm j at time t. DAGE"the
age of analyst i's forecast minus the age of the average analyst's forecast following "rm j at time t,
where age is the age of the forecast in days at the minimum forecast horizon date. DGEXP"the
number of years (including time t) that analyst i appeared in the data set minus the average number
of years analysts following "rm j at time t appeared in the data set. DFEXP"the number of years
(including time t) that analyst i supplied a forecast for "rm j minus the average number of years
analysts following "rm j had supplied forecasts. DNCOS"the number of companies followed by
analyst i at time t minus the average number of companies followed by an analyst following "rm j at
time t. DNSIC2"the number of 2 digit SICs followed by analyst i at time t minus the average
number of two-digit SICs followed by an analyst following "rm j at time t. DN¹OP10"dummy
variable with value of 1 if analyst works at a top decile size "rm (and 0 otherwise) minus the mean
value of dummy variable for analysts following "rm j at time t.
Pooled10 represents pooled regression coe$cients estimated from the 1985}1994 sample. Pooled5
represents pooled regression coe$cients estimated from the 1990}1994 sample. TS10 represents time
series average regression coe$cients estimated from the 1985}1994 sample. TS5 represents time
series average regression coe$cients estimated from the 1990}1994 sample.
The t-statistics in Panel C are calculated as x6 /(s
x
/Jn) where the x's are the regression coe$cients
for the individual years, s
x
is the standard deviation of the regression coe$cients across the years,
and n is the number of years.
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11Note from Table 3 that GEXP and FEXP are highly correlated (Pearson Correlation Coe$c-
ient"0.63). This condition reduces the model's ability to estimate the unique e!ects of the two
variables. When the model is estimated using GEXP as the only experience measure the coe$cient is
negative and signi"cant in 5 of 10 years compared to 2 of 10 years when both variables are included.
This result suggests the model does not completely disentangle the e!ects of the two variables.
variation in experience and less colinearity between general and "rm speci"c
experience in the latter half of the sample.11
Panel B reports the results of the pooled regression. Pooled10 represents the
regression coe$cients when the model is estimated during 1985}1994 and
Pooled5 represents the regression coe$cients when the model is estimated
during 1990}1994. The following discussion is for Pooled10 since the results for
the two models are generally consistent. Coe$cients for all variables in the
pooled regression have the predicted signs and are signi"cant at conventional
levels. While the hypotheses make no predictions about DAGE, prior research
suggests that its coe$cient should be positive. The coe$cients for DAGE are
consistently positive and signi"cant. The pooled regression results suggest that
relative absolute forecast errors increase at the rate of 0.35% per day, or 10.5%
per month. The implication for researchers is that careful controls for age are
needed when comparing forecasts.
The pooled regression coe$cient for DGEXP is !0.40%. This suggests that
an analyst who has seven years of forecasting experience (the 90th percentile
value) will have an expected absolute forecast error that is 2.4% smaller than an
analyst who has one year of forecasting experience (the 10th percentile value).
The pooled regression coe$cient for DFEXP is !0.94% suggesting that an
analyst with "ve years of "rm experience (the 90th percentile value) will on
average have an absolute forecast error that is 3.8% smaller than an analyst
with one year of "rm experience (the 10th percentile value). The magnitude of
the coe$cient appears reasonable relative to MWW who "nd that forecast
accuracy improves by 3% as "rm-speci"c forecast experience doubles. The
"ndings suggest that absolute forecast errors improve faster per year of "rm-
speci"c forecasting experience than per year of general forecasting experience.
As predicted, absolute forecast errors increase with the number of "rms and
industries followed. The pooled regression coe$cient for DNCOS is 0.07%. An
analyst who follows 23 "rms (the 90th percentile value) has an expected absolute
forecast error that is 1.5% larger than an analyst who follows two "rms (the 10th
percentile value).
The pooled regression coe$cient of 0.41% for DNSIC2 suggests an analyst
who follows eight industries (the 90th percentile value) has an expected forecast
error that is 2.9% larger than an analyst who follows one industry (the 10th
percentile value). The relative magnitudes of the coe$cients for DNCOS
and DNSIC2 are intuitively appealing since it seems reasonable that forecast
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12The model was estimated using the continuous variable (number of analysts employed by the
broker) instead of the dummy variable and the coe$cient on the continuous variable was negative
and signi"cant. The model was also estimated using both the dummy variable and the continuous
variable and both coe$cients were negative and signi"cant.
13This does not re#ect the improvement in forecast accuracy that is associated with "rm-speci"c
experience. Forecast accuracy improves by about 1% per year with "rm speci"c-experience.
Approximately 5% of the 1994 sample were analysts who were employed by large brokers and had
"ve years of general experience.
accuracy would deteriorate more with the addition of an industry than with the
addition of a "rm. The coe$cient for DNSIC2 might also be interpreted as
a measure of the bene"t of industry specialization. The coe$cient tells us the
change in forecast accuracy per industry followed holding constant the number
of companies followed.
The pooled regression coe$cient for DNTOP10 suggests that, as predicted,
analysts who work for large brokers have smaller absolute forecast errors than
other analysts. The pooled regression results suggest large broker analysts'
errors are 7.7% smaller than other analysts.12 The magnitude of the coe$cient
appears reasonable relative to Stickel (1992) who "nds that All-American
Analysts supply forecasts that are $0.027 more accurate than other analysts.
Given that the mean absolute forecast error in the current study is $0.594, this
suggests that analysts who work for large "rms supply forecasts that are
approximately $0.045 more accurate than other analysts. This is consistent with
a setting in which analysts at large "rms have better resources and more access
to managers' private information at the "rms they cover. On the other hand, it is
possible that large brokers have greater "nancial resources available to compen-
sate their analysts and therefore employ higher ability analysts. Regardless of
which explanation is more likely, this "nding provides a possible explanation for
Stickel's (1995) "nding that the capital markets respond more to the revisions of
large broker analysts. The capital markets may respond more to the forecasts of
these analysts because large broker analysts are perceived to be more accurate.
Combining the results from the tests of the experience and employer size
variables yields a prediction that an analyst employed at a large broker, with "ve
years experience would have an expected absolute forecast error that is approx-
imately 10% smaller than a "rst year analyst employed at a small broker.13
Given the large number of observations used to estimate the pooled regres-
sion and the considerable variation in the sign and magnitudes in the annual
regression coe$cients, it is possible that the e!ects are not as strong as the
pooled regression suggests. Time-series averages of the annual regression coe$-
cients are therefore reported in Panel C. TS10 represents the regression coe$-
cients when the model is estimated during 1985}1994 and TS5 represents the
regression coe$cients when the model is estimated during 1990}1994. Except
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for the coe$cient for DGEXP, the inferences drawn from the time-series averages
are consistent with those drawn from the pooled regression. The coe$cient for
DGEXP is positive (not negative as predicted) for TS10 and negative and
marginally signi"cant for TS5. Coe$cients for the remaining variables have
t-statistics that are smaller than the pooled regression, but still signi"cant at
conventional levels, and the coe$cients are generally of a similar magnitude as
the pooled regression.
5. Conclusion
I investigate whether analysts' ability, portfolio complexity and resources
explain systematic di!erences in forecast accuracy. The three factors are jointly
analyzed since they are likely to be correlated. The study uses a cross-sectional
approach since the objective is to explain cross-sectional di!erences in forecast
accuracy.
Forecast accuracy is found to increase with experience (a surrogate for ability)
and employer size (a surrogate for resources), and decrease with the number of
"rms and industries followed (surrogates for portfolio complexity). My overall
conclusion is that employer size alone, or the other labor market and portfolio
variables taken in combination, may provide information for capital market
participants to predict economically meaningful di!erences in forecast accuracy.
For example, knowing an analysts employer size, or knowing the number of
"rms and industries followed may be su$cient information for capital market
participants to predict economically meaningful di!erences in forecast accuracy.
Note, however, that even small systematic di!erences in forecast accuracy may
yield economically meaningful bene"ts for large investors.
The results imply that analysts' characteristics may be useful in predicting
forecast accuracy, and that market expectations studies may be improved by
modeling analysts' characteristics. A potential area for future research is to
investigate whether capital market participants consider analysts' ability, re-
source and portfolio complexity variables in forming earnings expectations.
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